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China’s position of non-interference in foreign governments’ affairs, while 
currently good for Chinese business, may threaten to increase international terrorism, 
deepen regime corruption, and erode U.S. political relevance in sub-Saharan Africa. 
China has empowered private enterprises, which can monopolize African market sectors, 
marginalize African businesses, and exacerbate local social conditions. Using non-violent 
uprising and violent resistance events from Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), 
World Governmental Indicators (WGI), and World Development Indicators (WDI) 
databases, this study seeks to determine to what extent China’s long-term economic goals 
may challenge U.S. security objectives in Africa. Observations from African states will 
form the base for analysis to establish a fundamental correlation between Chinese direct 
investment and Beijing’s foreign policy in Africa. 
This study illustrates that China’s foreign policy is not reflected in the actions of 
its state-owned enterprises and non-government organizations, increasing the potential 
for friction and conflict, and that China’s investment approach inherently requires the 
support of the host nation and may affect our African partners’ alignment with U.S. 
policy objectives. This study also highlights a significant gap in data regarding the state 
of our partners in Africa. 
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China’s rate of growth in Africa has given decision makers in the U.S. 
government reason for pause. China’s trade on the continent had, by 2009, surpassed U.S. 
trade with Africa for the first time.1 Foreign terms of Chinese trade have summarily 
negated the advantages of the World Trade Organization (WTO) manufacturing multi-
fiber agreement (MFA) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for 
African domestic markets.2 This, combined with unpalatable support to the South 
Sudanese conflict, impressed upon U.S. defense planners to consider the potential threat 
of China’s interactions in Africa. This study argues that China’s engagement strategy in 
Africa presents unique direct and indirect challenges to United States’ engagement 
strategy in Africa. China’s position of non-interference in foreign governments’ affairs, 
while currently good for Chinese business, could increase the threat of internationalized 
terrorism, deepen regime corruption, and erode U.S. political relevance in the region. 
Furthermore, China’s strategy has empowered private enterprise to wield national power 
projection to maintain the comparative advantage. More explicitly, when the Chinese 
government is unable to wield political influence in an area, it leverages Chinese 
corporations’ ability to monopolize market sectors, which can then elevate Chinese 
political relevance and influence. The problem arises when the interests of enterprises 
deviate from the larger goals of the Chinese government. The illumination of these facts 
could alter the perspective of military decision makers involved in African engagement 
strategies to consider broader objectives while solving immediate regional problems. This 
thesis suggests that there is a significant gap in research to understand when and where 
China’s political, economic, and legal activities are directly linked to each other. 
                                                 
1 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War, 3rd ed., Asia in 
World Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 319; China’s Growing Role in 
Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy: Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee on African Affairs, 112th Congress, 1 (2011) (statement of David H. Shinn, Adjunct 
Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs George Washington University). 
2 Gumisai Mutume, “Loss of Textile Markets Costs African Jobs: Diversification, Efficiency Hold 
Key for Economic Recovery,” Africa Renewal, 2006, 18. 
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Moreover, this study illuminates how U.S. and Chinese policies exacerbate local 
conditions that undermine U.S. national objectives in the region. 
B. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the Chinese emergence model that has 
been applied in Sub Saharan Africa. This study seeks to determine to what extent China’s 
long-term economic goals may challenge U.S. security objectives in Africa. Observations 
from African states form the base for analysis to establish a fundamental correlation 
between Chinese direct investment and foreign policy in Africa. Using investment, onset 
of civil unrest, and foreign aid data sets, this study highlights both the rules that drive 
Chinese foreign policy, and the potential effect that Chinese strategy has on local 
conditions in Africa. Highlighting these patterns serves to better inform U.S. Defense 
planners in the region by considering the peculiarities of each host nation, rather than 
adhering to a cross cutting “one size fits all” engagement strategy. 
To capture the broadest spectrum of relevant variables this study utilizes two 
databases for Chinese financial flows, as well as a social unrest onset dataset and a World 
Bank governmental indicators dataset. These datasets are all open-source, and most 
importantly, analyzed using the R code open-source community studio. Of particular 
interest to this study is the attraction of differing African markets to Chinese investment. 
Furthermore, the study investigates the role of international aid in this attraction. 
Additionally, this study uncovers host governmental characteristics that favor the Chinese 
government and their potential to exacerbate troubled social conditions in the host nation. 
In particular, the China AidData set is utilized to consider the investment typology of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as other official flows (OOF) such as foreign aid. 
The Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), World Governmental Indicators (WGI), 
and AidData sets are categorized into two discernable operating environments: 1) Largely 
state owned resource markets and 2) Largely privatized service sector markets. The 
amalgamation of these data sets provides examples of national subsidies, private 
investment, and Chinese migrant remittance that amplify China’s extensions of national 
power. Although a critique of Chinese foreign policy is offered, this paper advocates that 
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the domestic policies of our strategic partners, rather than Chinese foreign policy, should 
be the target of the U.S. government’s effort. Moreover, U.S. foreign policy and military 
action should more precisely consider the motivations of third-party nations, for which 
this study serves as a primer. 
 
China’s aid has grown rapidly year after year since 2006, outpacing USAID from 2010 to 
2012. Though both nations reduced aid in the years that followed, Chinese FDI outlasted 
U.S. outreach programs and has become a larger political influencer in Africa. 
Figure 1.  Chinese Aid, Foreign Direct Investment, and USAID3 
Figure 1 shows the corresponding year along the x axis and amount of donor aid 
in U.S. dollars along the y-axis. The redline represents Chinese aid dollars to Africa since 
2005, while the blue line represents U.S. aid dollars during the same period. From 2010 
to 2012, China had for the first time surpassed U.S. aid dollars on the continent. The 
black line, representing Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), illustrates an interesting 
relationship between aid dollars and investment, which will be explored in detail 
throughout this paper. 
This research expands on existing analysis in this field. In particular, comparative 
studies such as Scott Kastner’s “Buying Influence” have illuminated the difficulty with 
                                                 
3 Adapted from Austin M. Strange et al., “Tracking Underreported Financial Flows China’s 
Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015. 
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defining “foreign influence.”4 Therefore, attempting to consider the ramifications of such 
activities is, at least, equally difficult. For example, this study expands on quantitative 
market analysis findings to explore the dependence of regional “stability,” on similar 
functions of third party nations. Stability is an oft-stated condition found in U.S. Africa 
Command’s (AFRICOM) 2016 posture statement.5 Stability is a term applied broadly. 
This study considers the definition of stability among the SCAD coding scheme, USAID 
planning documents and the AFRICOM posture statement. As it relates to our 
methodology, stability refers to the relationship between governments and their 
constituents. Moreover, stability defines the natural and artificial conditions and events in 
a sociopolitical space that bind citizens to social order. This may include individual 
conditions such as employment, income, and food and shelter availability. This may also 
include public policy such as tax codes, voting rights, and freedom of the press. 
This research considers a dependent variable of stability, which will include data 
reflecting unrest, governance, and economic condition of the affected host nation. Using 
non-violent uprising and violent resistance events from SCAD, as well as WGI and 
World Development Indicators (WDI) databases, this study considered numerous 
potential independent variables, to extrapolate China’s side effect on local conditions that 
could challenge U.S. stability goals in the region. 
C. FINDINGS 
At first glance, Chinese aid and investment appears to have no direct impact on 
civil unrest in the region. Further, quantitative research, such as Austin Strange et al.’s 
AidData program, has suggested a typology of trade markets that favor Chinese direct 
investment6 while Kastner’s study had expanded the dependent variable to consider 
political accommodation through trade conditions.7 This research expanded the study 
                                                 
4 S. L. Kastner, “Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of Chinas International Trade,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 6 (September 1, 2016): 980–1007. 
5 AFRICOM Posture Statement: Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th 
Congress, 2 (2016) (statement of General David M. Rodriguez, USA, U.S. Africa Commander). 
6 Strange et al., “Tracking Underreported Financial Flows China’s Development Finance and the Aid-
Conflict Nexus Revisited.” 
7 Kastner, “Buying Influence?” 
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further to consider the onset of civil unrest, or perhaps more accurately, the lack of civil 
unrest, while considering the conditions that China seek in a target nation. This will be 
covered more in detail in the analysis section, but generally, our analysis infers from the 
data that: 
1. Chinese aid results in increases of Chinese FDI, typically in three year 
evolutions. FDI targets skilled labor forces and crude economies unless 
the host nation is a regional manufacturing competitor.  
2. Chinese aid is heavily tied to commercial intent, providing infrastructure 
improvement in areas that provide long-term economic benefits. This 
usually involves non-concessional loans and debt forgiveness that 
provides Chinese investors leverage in host nation currency.  
3. China considers political stability in target nations much more important 
than security or human rights. This is reflected in aid endowments that are 
closely tied to SOE investments. 
These conditions suggest that China follows a considerably different decision 
process than the U.S. when adjudicating aid and considering FDI ventures. Though 
business shrewdness is appreciated in the Western context, transparency and trust are not 
valued equally in both cultures. The Chinese government has traditionally maintained 
heavy centralized control over businesses and corporations, but has over time lost control. 
Companies have become more competitive with other Chinese and international 
corporations. While companies seek to maximize their profit for themselves individually 
and for China collectively, their practices and consequences of their actions in African 
countries often conflict with the central government’s policy and intent in those 
countries. This creates contradictions, discontent, and mistrust, occasionally leading to 
civil disputes, protests, and even violence. For instance, in Angola in 2006 the inequality 
in pay between Chinese and Angolan workers, and the lack of inclusion of Angolan 
workers led to disputes with Chinese companies.8 In 2010 in Zambia, two Chinese 
supervisors fired weapons at a crowd of workers protesting over wages, and injured 13 
                                                 
8 Manuel Ennes Ferreira, “China in Angola: Just a Passion for Oil?,” in China Returns to Africa: A 
Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, ed. Christopher Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de 
Oliveira (London: Hurst, 2008), 313–14. 
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workers.9 Amid other anti-China reactions, between 2007 and 2012, 60 Chinese workers 
were kidnapped and or killed in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and South 
Sudan.10 These facts are only amplified by our statistical analysis that shows a strong 
attraction of Chinese investment to under-industrialized, resource-laden African nations. 
Social instability in these countries is largely driven by unemployment and weakness in 
democratic regimes. Ironically, the sources of Chinese economic strength in Africa also 
provide the largest vulnerabilities to Chinese national political objectives and narrative 
abroad. 
The growth of Chinese economic interests in Africa should come as no surprise. 
The continent offers substantial opportunity, particularly for transitioning economies. 
However, unregulated Chinese use of aid-based development and foreign military sales 
programs have challenged U.S. security objectives in the region. China has also seized on 
the opportunity to conflate shrewd business practice with altruistic “aid” and debt 
cancellation schemes. This has cornered weak and desperate regimes into accepting 
offers that are difficult to refuse. This is most apparent in Tanzania, Kenya, and Nigeria, 
accounting for half of our closest allies on the continent. While military capability is a 
large consideration for AFRICOM, special intelligence capabilities to illuminate these 
occurrences should be a close second. 
In order to capture the breadth of underlying market factors associated with civil 
unrest and stability, this research suggests that there is a correlation between market 
potential, the intent of foreign investment or aid, and the level of civil unrest in a given 
country. 
                                                 
9 Barry Bearak, “Zambia Uneasily Balances Chinese Investment and Workers’ Resentment,” New 
York Times, November 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/africa/21zambia.html. 
10 David L. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford University Press, 2013), 200. 
 7 
 
Chinese investment is on the rise and in 2011 surpassed U.S. totals on the continent. 
China has recently strayed from historic anchor countries and has grown a closer affinity 
to the U.S. partnering profile in Africa.  
Figure 2.  Comparison of Chinese Aid Since 200011 
It is also apparent that China has recently divested from historic anchor countries 
on the continent. As seen in Figure 2, Chinese aid has consistently increased in Uganda 
and Tanzania since 2000, with 2006 marking an aggressive diversification of China’s 
portfolio as a whole. It is also possible that China is solving some problems of their own, 
and going it about it in an indirect way. Agriculture is becoming as much, if not a bigger 
focus for Chinese development over resource extraction. The mentioned merchandise 
competitiveness in the region could hint that there are government incentives offered to 
gain Chinese export promises in return for fixed agricultural prices. This is even more 
important in countries whose national currency is extraordinarily inflated, such as 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, and would require an investor to own a significant shareholding 
in national bonds or alternative currencies to remain competitive. Interestingly, no 
significant flows seem to be directly attributed to “the development of agricultural 
output,” however qualitative evidence suggests that privatization of the farming industry, 
and Chinese migrant laborers, are potentially netting China an agricultural import 
                                                 
11Adapted from Strange et al., “Tracking Underreported Financial Flows China’s Development 
Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited.” 
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source.12 Though initial analysis does not directly suggest that there is a relationship 
between Chinese official funding (OF) determination and political events, this figure 
illustrates an interesting change in Chinese foreign policy, away from numerous “all-
weather” regional partners bringing them ever closer to U.S. regional contest. 
While host-nation political stability pragmatically attracts Chinese aid, other 
factors of a host regime’s ability to govern are not considered by the Chinese 
government. This is a significant difference from the United States, which utilizes entities 
such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) to incentivize governance objectives.13 Interestingly, this 
analysis has also shown a strong correlation between Chinese OF endowment and 
USAID grants within the same host nation. This correlation is more nuanced than a 
simple race for influence. When testing the reverse, that is, whether USAID follows 
China OF, there is no statistically significant correlation. By expanding the variables to 
include trade competitiveness indices, the attraction of Chinese aid to USAID programs 
continues to hold true. This simple variation has demonstrated that U.S. and Chinese 
perspectives on providing aid are considerably different. Furthermore, China holds the 
presence of U.S. aid and investment in high priority regarding its representational forms 
of aid endowment. The United States, in contrast, considers stability a higher priority, 
and generally does not consider the other economic actors that become barriers to foreign 
policy objectives. Tellingly, the United States has managed a balanced portfolio of 
economic and military aid programs, once it decides to move forward in a target nation. 
This only validates the “strings attached” developmental model that China has been 
keenly aware to avoid. Indeed, a closer consideration for numerous agencies definitions 
of “stability” should be implemented at all levels of operations on the African continent. 
                                                 
12 “Trade Map,” International Trade Centre, www.intracen.org/marketanalysis; “Market Access Map,” 
International Trade Centre, n.d., www.intracen.org/marketanalysis. 
13 Anthony Lake et al., More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa: 
Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), 101; Curt Tarnoff, 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (CRS Report No. RL32427) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2016), 19–20. 
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D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The second chapter considers recent Chinese foreign policy and drivers of 
Chinese interest and engagement in Africa. The third chapter addresses U.S. foreign 
policy and engagement toward Africa. The fourth chapter examines the connection 
between Chinese aid and investment and expanding Chinese markets in Africa, 
ungoverned spaces, and instability. The conclusion considers implications for U.S. policy 
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II. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND ENGAGEMENT IN 
AFRICA 
A. BACKGROUND 
China’s relationship with Africa has been important for over fifty years. Although 
Sino-African relations have waxed and waned throughout this time, being eclipsed by 
relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, big power 
politics, and now China’s primary focus on its periphery, China has not lost sight of the 
importance of Africa. Africa has served an important role in the emergence of China 
during the Cold War, and even today. Since 2008, China’s global reputation has generally 
declined worldwide, except in Africa and some countries in Asia. While Africa as a 
“developing” continent places it third in the arrangement of Chinese foreign policy, 
China has benefited from this relationship politically and economically, and desires to 
continue benefiting in the future. China seeks to restore its “rightful place” internationally 
by expanding its economic ties and political leverage, achieve its two centenary goals, 
and values the support that Africa will provide in accomplishing these goals.14 As the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) moves closer toward its 100-year mark, advancing its 
position economically and politically to achieve a more prosperous Chinese society 
become more critical to the CCP. 
Africa is important to China for ideological, political and economic reasons. 
China has considered Africa as its “most reliable ally in the international struggle” 
politically, and views mutually benefiting relations to strengthen China’s path to 
sustainable development.15 While elements of ideology still persist in China’s foreign 
                                                 
14 Ian Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise, Routledge Contemporary China 
Series 14 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 197; Hu Jintao, “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party 
Congress,” People’s Daily Online, November 8, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/
2012-11/17/c_131981259_3.htm; “Xi Seeks New Outlook on Foreign Affairs,” Xinhua, November 30, 
2014, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-11/30/content_34188844.htm. The two centenary goals are 
“building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects, accelerate socialist modernization, and achieve 
the great renewal of the Chinese nation.” Jintao, “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” 
2012.  
15 Manuel Ennes Ferreira, “China in Angola: Just a Passion for Oil?,” in China Returns to Africa: A 
Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, ed. Christopher Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de 
Oliveira (London: Hurst, 2008), 144–45. 
 12 
policy toward Africa, China’s emphasis on ideology has declined, and the essence of 
China’s foreign policy in Africa today is marked by political and economic interests, 
through which China seeks to advance its global position vis-à-vis Western nations. 
Although China is more effective in its messaging than previous decades, it still must 
contend with the realities of the actual implementation of its policies, to include 
contradictions, shortcomings, and emerging security issues in order for its policies to be 
effective.  
China’s ideology persisted in its positions of non-interference, anti-colonialism, 
and anti-hegemonism. China has claimed to share a common identity with Africa as a 
developing country and from its experience with imperialism. From 1982 to 1983 
Premier Zhao Ziyang toured 11 African countries to renew ties and asserted China’s 
shared “third world identity.”16 During the Cold War China increased ties in Africa while 
Western nations were focused elsewhere.17 After the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, 
Qian Qichen, the Chinese Foreign Minister, visited 11 African countries in effort to 
expand China’s foreign relations.18 In the late 1990s, China began an active campaign of 
criticizing Western nations and their “hegemonism and power politics,” stipulations for 
democracy and human rights, and the west’s shifting focus from Africa during the Cold 
War.19 In his address to the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit 
in 2000, Hu Jintao stated “without peace and development in China and Africa, there will 
be no global peace and development.”20 In a reference to imperialism, Hu spoke of the 
“widening gap between North and South [sic],” and China and Africa’s “struggle against 
subjugation.”21 Chinese leaders have continued to reference China and Africa’s common 
                                                 
16 Christopher Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds., China Returns to Africa: A 
Rising Power and a Continent Embrace (London: Hurst, 2008), 5. 
17 Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, 312. 
18 Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, 311. 
19 Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, 312, 314. 
20 Hu Jintao, “Speech by President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China,” Forum On China-
Africa Cooperation, November 4, 2006, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/SP32009/t606840.htm#. 
21 Hu Jintao, “Speech by President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China,” 2. 
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struggles, and have focused their messaging on peace and development and win-win 
cooperation, seeking to isolate the West and gain favor for China.22 
In the past 50 years Africa has played an important role in China’s political 
objectives of expanding the acceptance of the “One China” policy, gaining international 
legitimacy, and restoring China to its proper place. Reunification with Taiwan and 
advocating the existence of one China has been at the forefront of Chinese foreign policy 
since the 1950s. It is important to recognize that China historically does not use aid for 
political leverage, with the exception of the “One China” policy.23 China has established 
official diplomatic relations with all African countries that have avoided official relations 
with Taiwan, and has broken ties with countries that have established official relations 
with Taiwan.24 Yun Sun, a fellow at the East Asia Program of the Henry L. Stimson 
Center noted that only three African countries, Burkino Faso, Swaziland, and São Tomé 
and Príncipe, had diplomatic ties with Taiwan.25 Most recently, Gambia, China, has been 
resolute in its position on Taiwan, and enforces this position not just bilaterally, but in 
multilateral institutions. During the first FOCAC Summit in 2006 in Beijing, China, 
invited the countries that officially recognize Taiwan to attend as observers only.26 This 
summit demonstrated China’s successes in promoting the “One China” policy, as well as 
China’s position as a global actor in Africa. 
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The United Nations is another example where China has used Africa to advance 
its global position. In the 1960s China began lobbying to obtain admission into the 
United Nations (UN) and remove the Republic of China, and in 1971 with the assistance 
of many African countries China accomplished both.27 Between 1964 and 1971 China 
spread aid across 30 African countries, and started aid programs in 13 additional African 
countries after it won a seat in the UN.28 China has continued to use its influence with 
developing nations in the UN to advance its position on non-interference. In 2006 and 
2008 it successfully blocked UN sanctions on Sudan and Zimbabwe respectively.29 
China continues to be an advocate for African countries, promoting the equal 
representation of developing countries in the UN.30 While Africa has remained important 
for China politically, it has been even more important economically. 
Economic engagements are the most active form of China’s foreign policy today. 
As noted by Ana Alves, China’s interest in Africa has changed from ideological 
motivations to fulfilling economic needs.31 China became increasingly involved in Africa 
in the 1990s and even more so after the millennium. This period marked the development 
and implementation of China’s “going out,” a strategy of the CCP to its enterprises to 
expand business and invest overseas. The Chinese government had previously limited 
outward investment by private and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the 14th Party 
Congress in 1992, President Jiang Zemin stated that “we should grant to enterprises and 
to science and technology research institutes the power to engage in foreign trade, and we 
should encourage enterprises to expand their investments abroad and their transnational 
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operations.”32 In 1996 President Jiang toured six African nations and addressed the 
Organization of African Unity, promising aid projects, increased political cooperation, 
and expanded economic ties.33 During his tour he also proposed the establishment of 
FOCAC, which has become the centerpiece for Sino-African relations.34 FOCAC 
convenes every three years and has held six ministerial conferences and two summits.35 
After returning from a visit to Africa, Jiang gave a speech explicitly encouraging Chinese 
firms to “go out” and expand their business and investments abroad.36 The first FOCAC 
Ministerial Conference was held in 2000; the same year, Premier Zhu Rongji made 
reference to “going out” (zou-chu-qu) to the National People’s Congress, and in 2001 
China’s Go Global policy was implemented in the CCP’s 10th Five Year Plan.37 In 2002 
at the 16th Party Congress Jiang further emphasized the importance of investing abroad 
and “safeguarding our national economic security.”38 
In 2006 China upgraded its interactions and relationship with African nations with 
high-level visits to African nations, expressed its commitment to developing relations in 
Africa, labeled 2006 as “China’s Year in Africa,” and released its first Africa policy 
statement.39 The same year China hosted the first FOCAC summit in Beijing, inviting not 
just ministers but top leaders as well. In his address to the summit, Hu Jintao spoke of 
China and Africa’s “common pursuit of friendship, peace, cooperation and 
development,” and how China has “never strayed from the principle of enhancing 
friendship, treating each other as equals, extending mutual support and promoting 
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common development in building our ties.”40 Hu Jintao also stated “without peace and 
development in China and Africa, there will be no global peace and development.”41 
In the wake of these foreign policy and economic policy shifts, trade ties between 
China and African countries increased. In 2009 China became the world’s largest energy 
consumer and China-Africa trade surpassed United States-Africa trade, and in 2010 
China became dependent on imports for more than half of its total consumption.42 From 
2000 to 2012 China’s trade with Africa increased from $10 billion to $180 billion.43 At 
the second FOCAC Summit and 6th Ministerial Conference, president Xi Jinping outlined 
China’s new “one upgrade, five pillars, and ten plans” for Africa. Xi Jinping and African 
leaders agreed to advance their “relationship to a comprehensive strategic cooperative 
partnership,” and set five pillars of “political equality and mutual trust, win-win 
economic cooperation, mutually enriching cultural exchanges, mutual assistance in 
security, and solidarity and coordination in international affairs.”44 While countries on 
China’s periphery and great powers remain China’s focus, Africa remains a “foundation,” 
where China can maintain consistent messaging on “strengthening of solidarity and 
cooperation” with a broad global audience of developing countries.45 Through this China 
is able to use its common ground toward its interests. 
B. CHINESE INSTITUTIONS  
Institutions involved in China’s foreign policy and economic engagement are 
complex, have confusing relationships, and also have conflicting responsibilities. This 
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increases outside skepticism about China’s transparency, while also reducing the ability 
of the Chinese government to adequately control corporations and SOEs, and hold these 
organizations accountable and in-line with Chinese foreign policy. In general, the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the lead on political affairs, and the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is responsible for economic affairs.46 However, this 
division of labor is not so clear cut, with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance 
also having a responsibility in economic engagements, such as foreign aid.47 James 
Reilly and Wu Na observe that “perhaps nowhere else in the world is [MOFCOM] so 
central to China’s foreign policy.”48 The complexity of the relationships and lines of 
authority, coupled with the negative influence and impact that Chinese companies have in 
Africa undermines China’s foreign policy and objectives in Africa. 
MOFCOM is the primary Chinese institution responsible for aid disbursements 
and bilateral trade negotiations with Africa, but it also consults with the MFA and 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) for projects and agreements, and coordinates with China 
Export-Import (Exim) Bank on concessional loans.49 At the ground level, MOFCOM 
relies on Economic and Commercial Counselor (ECC) offices to act as local MOFCOM 
representatives in Africa, however these offices are under the administrative control of 
Chinese embassies, which are under the MFA (See Figure 3.).50 ECC offices are 
responsible for monitoring Chinese corporations, however they do not have direct 
authority over Chinese corporations, nor does MOFCOM.51 This means that Chinese 
government institutions can exert little control over the activities of Chinese businesses, 
which can undermine Chinese foreign policy and international trade organizations. 
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With no clear lines for authority, and layers of bureaucracy, the effectiveness of the 
Chinese government to sufficiently control companies that are operating outside the 
intent of the central government is greatly reduced. 
Figure 3.  Oversight and Implementing Agencies in China’s Africa Policy52 
The MFA represents the Chinese government and executes China’s foreign 
policy. It is responsible for releasing foreign policy documents and statements, along with 
shaping China’s Africa policy.53 The MFA is also in charge of all the Chinese embassies, 
which are responsible for all Chinese citizens in Africa.54  
The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
manages China’s SOEs, estimated at 120 firms, and controls $3.7 trillion in assets.55 The 
SASAC has operational control over SOEs, either owning or controlling at least 40% of a 
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company.56 The SASAC acts much like a board of directors, seeking to maximize the 
value and profit of each firm.57 
As MOFCOM, MFA, and SASAC are all ministry-level bureaucracies, they can 
undercut each other, with any disputes needing resolution from the Chinese State 
Council.58 With no clear lines for authority, and layers of bureaucracy, the effectiveness 
of the Chinese government to sufficiently control companies that are operating outside 
the intent of the central government is greatly reduced. 
C. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
China’s engagement strategy in Africa has been focused around obtaining natural 
resources, using aid and investment to gain influence, and expanding and diversifying 
trade markets. But why choose Africa? First, Africa is one of the few places on earth 
where new natural resource discoveries are being made. Twenty-one percent of the 
world’s oil production originates from Africa, while 85% of the new discoveries of 
deposits in the last decade where made in West and central Africa.59 Second, China 
views Africa as “open for business,” considering Western reluctance to work with less 
that desirable regimes.60 Third, China seeks out resource opportunities that will not draw 
unnecessary political attention, such as competition for large contracts in the Middle East. 
China also requires vast amounts of iron ore, “copper, cobalt, cadmium, manganese… 
and so on- that African countries can supply,” making it one of the top steel producers in 
the world.61 China’s government and businesses have adapted as the environment and 
markets have changed, such as Deng Xiaoping’s “opening up” policy in 1978 and Jiang 
Zemin’s “going out” policy in 1992.62 China’s continues to provide aid and investments, 
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and has expanded production, industry, and diversified markets. Chinese activities and 
interests are expanding throughout Africa.63 While state-owned enterprises (SOE) have 
been downplayed as implementing the central government’s foreign strategy, it is worth 
noting that in 2010 SOEs comprised 75% of China’s ODI.64 Larry Hanauer and Lyle 
Morris note this figure as “over 90 percent,” coming from “China’s large SOEs.”65 This 
indicates that SOEs still play an integral part to China’s approach. Interesting enough, 
China does not shirk from “backward” countries, and in fact, has preferred to work with 
these niche clienteles where little competition existed. This has not only guaranteed 
exclusivity but has also allowed China to institutionalize its presence in each country. 
China’s lack of natural resources necessitated a break from traditional dependence 
on intermediate markets for energy sources. As a statement from the International Energy 
Agency points out, “over the next two decades, China’s oil requirements will double to 
about 16 million barrels per day,” with about two-thirds being imported from outside the 
country.66 Nigeria, the eighth largest oil exporter globally, with the world’s fifth largest 
reserve, exported one million barrels of oil to China in 2015.67 In 2016, China signed an 
$80 billion investment deal with Nigeria for “oil and gas infrastructure, pipelines, 
refineries, power, facility refurbishments and upstream,” to be conducted by Chinese 
companies.68 Other raw material, such as metals, are also critical for China. Greg Pollock 
points out that “China is the world’s largest consumer of copper and has invested $170 
million in the Zambian copper sector.”69 
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It should also come as no surprise that with an increased population, China has 
grown an import dependence on agricultural products, particularly soy beans. “China 
hosts 20% of the world population but possesses only 7% of the world’s arable land.”70 
African governments are already considering the revenue possibilities from Chinese 
“mega farming,” Angola forecasted a $6 billion market after 2008.71 
As Craig Richardson points out, good governments should use resource 
advantages and windfalls to support diversification in manufacturing and tech sectors.72 
Unfortunately, the opposite is true in many African nations, particularly those locked into 
foreign trade agreements that regulate world market prices. Additionally, resource laden 
countries are more likely to fall into trade credit debt with direct investors. For example, 
despite Zimbabwe’s multiple past credit defaults, in 2013 the Chinese Exim bank 
extended another $145 million loan, in addition to an unpaid $200 million loan in 1997.73 
In order to maintain balance, crude economies will then receive concessional aid for 
development while paying down debt by pledging their natural resources. “In a 2012 
contract all future revenue from Harare and Victoria Falls International Airports were 
offered to Chinese as security for a $381 million loan to upgrade infrastructure.”74 
Conversely, resource scarce countries will find direct and indirect competition from 
foreign markets, as well as inflated pricing for natural resources and reduced foreign 
currency leverage. 
Deborah Brautigam notes that China has used aid as a springboard for investment, 
and has used leasing former projects, soft privatization and joint ventures to recapitalize 
off former aid projects.75 China’s own experience as a recipient of aid has shaped much 
of how China engages other developing countries today, and has kept it focused on 
                                                 
70 Raine, China’s African Challenges, 41. 
71 Raine, China’s African Challenges, 41. 
72 Craig J. Richardson, “Zimbabwe: Why Is One of the World’s Least-Free Economies Growing so 
Fast?,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis, no. 722 (2013): 7, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264434. 
73 Richardson, “Zimbabwe,” 7. 
74 Richardson, “Zimbabwe,” 7. 
75 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 62. 
 22 
advancing the idea of economic cooperation for mutual benefit.76 In fact, China still 
receives aid today, and Chinese officials maintain that China is still a developing country, 
so while the amount of aid it provides vis-à-vis Western nations is small, it is significant 
to China. China maintains that its actions toward developing countries is how it wanted to 
be treated as it emerged in the international environment. Brautigam notes how China’s 
aid is different than the West as it is shaped by a foreign policy established in the 1950s 
(non-interference), that it follows a different set of core ideas about development, that 
China is a developing country and aid recipient itself, and that China’s aid is used as a 
tool to boost China’s own exports and growth.77 It also used to secure access to markets. 
In his testimony to the U.S.–China Commission in 2005, Princeton Lyman stated that 
investments by Chinese SOEs “do not have to be profitable if they serve overall Chinese 
objectives…China can use aid, investment and technical inputs to win long term gains 
and access, with a willingness to ‘lose’ much in the short run to gain in the long run.”78 
Bates Gill and James Reilly call this a “moral-hazard problem,” where Chinese 
companies “act in a fiscally irresponsible manner” knowing that Chinese banks will back 
them.79 A major problem in understanding Chinese aid and investment is that the figures 
are not accurately represented, often reported too low in official Chinese government 
reports, and “grossly inflated” in media reports.80 
Prior to 1978, China had no overseas direct investment (ODI); in the 1980s as 
foreign trade was encouraged, the central government maintained a high degree of 
control, while in the 1990s its regulations relaxed and projects and investment increased 
to $1.2 billion, and by 2010 ODI had increased dramatically to over $68 billion.81 
China’s recent investments in Africa are best described by what David Shambaugh calls 
                                                 
76 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 70. 
77 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 24–25. 
78 Princeton N. Lyman, China’s Rising Role in Africa (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), 6. 
79 Gill and Reilly, “The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa,” 48–49. 
80 Michael A. Glosny, Meeting the Development Challenge in the 21st Century: American and 
Chinese Perspectives on Foreign Aid (The Committee on United States-China Relations, 2006), 12–13, 
http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/library/20070201_ForeignAidReport.pdf. 
81 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 177. 
 23 
the “push” and “pull” factors, where the push factor comes from a saturation of 
investment capital in a domestic market that drives companies to look for overseas 
opportunities, and the pull factor is host countries that are looking for inbound 
investment.82 Alden notes that Chinese investment to Africa is predominantly resource 
oriented, and focused in resource rich countries such as Angola, Sudan, Chad, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nigeria, and South Africa.83 Until 2005, Sudan was the top recipient of Chinese 
non-financial overseas direct investment in Africa (22%), and was the ninth largest 
recipient ($352 million) of China’s total outward foreign direct investment.84 However, 
China’s investment in Africa remains a small portion of China’s total global investment, 
reflecting China’s arrangement of priorities, with Asia being its largest target for 
investment.85 Nonetheless, Chinese aid in Africa has only intensified since the 
establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the aggressive 
implementation of the “going out” policy since 2006. In countries such as Ghana, Togo, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe aid endowments have accelerated or surpassed the United 
States, subsequently introducing equivalent increases in Chinese FDI. In Kenya from 
2007 to 2011, U.S. FDI was $12 million, whereas Chinese FDI was $230 million.86 
China seeks to expand and diversify trade markets in Africa. In 1995 Sino-
African trade was under $5 billion; in 2010 it was over $127 billion.87 In 2014 two-way 
trade between China and Africa reached $221 billion.88 China has been focused on oil, 
minerals, and other resources such as timber, but recently has expanded to industry and 
manufacturing. To provide a clearer picture of the dynamics of China’s aid and trade 
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practices today, China’s trade practices were shaped by its experience with Japan in the 
1970s and 1980s, and the application of the Goa formula in economic cooperation, where 
mutual benefit is sought through exchange of raw materials for industry, technology and 
financing.89 China also used a form of barter trade, known as buchang maoyi, with 
similar characteristics for companies that lacked access to foreign exchange.90 While it 
would be presumed that China’s intent for trade is to benefit economically, China 
operates on a trade deficit with African Portuguese-speaking countries and Sudan.91 
Deborah Brautigam supports this claim by saying “[China’s] goal was not to provide 
altruistic handouts to developing countries, rather to establish concessional finance.”92 
Brautigam goes on to point out that the quality of the relationship was established by 
avoiding the “paternalistic” stigma that traditionally came with Western style aid.93 
1. Obstacles and Challenges 
In general, corporate corruption and lack of accountability, contradictions 
between China’s ambiguous political positions and its actions in Africa, and a lack of 
transparency have resulted in a rising anti-China sentiment. Issues in China’s economic 
policies counter Beijing’s principles and threaten Sino-African relations. Elizabeth 
Economy notes that despite central control measures, weak corporate responsibility 
deteriorates relationships abroad.94 When China decentralized its economic policies 
during its “going out” phase, it reduced the central government’s ability to influence 
actions of private Chinese entrepreneurs.95 Tensions and contradictions arose between 
conflicting interests of the state bureaucracies and the individual companies operating in 
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Africa.96 Also, because the Ministry of Commerce is the centralized decision maker for 
investment and foreign aid, this causes a poor perception between assistance and profit-
making commercial activity, leading to perceptions of China’s “neo-colonialism.”97 As 
noted by Michael Glosny, a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, China must 
“address the perception that much of its aid is tied to obtaining resources, practicing 
mercantilism or neo-colonialism, and supporting states of concern.”98 
Rising anti-China sentiment in Africa has manifested itself in demonstrations 
against Chinese companies regarding violations of labor practices, unfair treatment, and 
influx of poor Chinese goods.99 African countries that are resource poor may also view 
China as a competitor.100 Although China claims to have a “no strings” policy, Chinese 
grants have been followed by awarding large contracts to Chinese construction firms, and 
private contracts for Chinese companies have increased since 2000.101 In addition, 
China’s no strings policy undermines international efforts to restrict repressive and 
corrupt regimes.102 China’s demand for commodities has shifted African exports away 
from Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) markets to 
China.103 As a result, aid is harder to track, causing negative perceptions of China’s 
intentions. 
China faces more barriers in realizing the implementation of its policies, and must 
contend with the corrupt business practices of individual Chinese companies, 
contradictions in its policies, and an increase in threats to its business and individual 
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citizens in Africa. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Ministry of Commerce do 
not have direct authority over Chinese businesses overseas, and while the Chinese 
government is attempting to regain control, accountability and enforcement of regulations 
is difficult.104  
While China advocates policies such as non-interference and peace and 
development, and has repeatedly stated that it will uphold the international order “by the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter,”105 China faces challenges in contradictions 
and potential for backlash. China has not consistently penalized small and developing 
countries when they violate international rules and norms, and has also dealt with nations 
that the international community admonishes such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.106 With its 
“no strings attached” policy, China’s position challenges corrupt countries’ incentives for 
implementation of accountability, human rights and democratic practice.107 
China’s principle of non-interference has been challenged in places such as 
Sudan, where China’s interests have become more entangled. China has faced pressure 
from the international community and must demonstrate that it can be a responsible 
stakeholder in developing countries.108 For instance China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), one of China’s largest oil companies, and a state owned enterprise, 
owned over 40% shares of Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), and 
Petrodar Operating Company, the two largest oil companies in Sudan.109 The Chinese 
government has provided heavy military equipment to the Sudanese government, which 
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continued to fuel Sudan’s civil war in the past two decades.110 After China received 
criticism for its policies ignoring poor governance, corruption, and conflict in Sudan, 
President Hu Jintao visited Sudan to persuade the Sudanese President to accept a UN-
African Union peacekeeping mission (UN Mission in Sudan).111 The presence of large 
quantities of Chinese small arms in Chad and Tanzania has also brought China’s 
responsibility into question.112 
China’s lack of transparency poses a great concern for African nations, and the 
United States and other international actors. While China has made positive contributions 
to African nations, African economies are adversely affected by Chinese aid and 
investment that fosters corrupt business and governance practices.113 China can use this 
to its advantage for political or economic leverage. Lyman notes that China’s economic 
involvement in Africa “come with no conditionality related to governance, fiscal probity 
or other of the concerns that now drive western donors.”114 Hanauer and Morris point out 
that China’s lack of transparency allows for personal gain, and corruption is enabled with 
the high value of money exchanged between China and African governments that hold 
exclusivity on resources and markets.115 Chinese business are able to exploit corrupt 
officials, and by not releasing accurate aid and investment data, China is able to 
undermine efforts to promote good governance. 
This is all important in Africa, as Africa contains a number of highly corrupt 
governments and fragile states. Richard Schiere points out that nations assisting in the 
development of African states could support “fragile states by improving transparency of 
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their interventions, thereby facilitating the coordination of development cooperation.”116 
In 2011 Transparency International noted that Chinese firms were “among the most likely 
to pay bribes,” and were ranked 27th out of 28 countries. 
China’s lack of transparency goes beyond aid and investment. Lloyd Thrall noted 
that China supplied over “25 percent of the total African arms market in 2011,” likely 
making it the “largest single supplier of small arms and light weapons to Africa,” and 
from 2002 to 2010 China provided over $2.5 billion in arms to at least 16 African 
nations.117 Thrall highlights that the Chinese central government does not disclose the 
volume of the sales, its role, or policies.118 Furthermore, arms transfers have been shown 
to be a significant predictor of increased political unrest.119 From 2006–2010, China 
provided sales that included fighter aircraft, trainers, transport aircraft, small arms 
ammunition, rockets, and mortars to eighteen African countries.120 Additionally, the UN 
has found Chinese arms in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Somalia, 
and Sudan against UN sanctions.121 This again leads to negative perceptions of China’s 
activities in Africa, and demands China to act more as a responsible stakeholder. 
2. Criticism 
A popular criticism of Chinese investment in Africa is that it has embarked on a 
neo-colonialist foreign policy which has largely exploited the abandoned European 
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interest of the 1960s. Though there is a basis for this argument when considering the 
import of a cheap domestic labor forces, it is clear that China’s corporate model also 
provides benefits to the local population. Robert Rotberg observes: “Unlike Belgium 
which [built] roads solely for the extraction of resources in the DRC, China is 
constructing or improving roads that are suitable not only for the transportations of 
resources but which citizen can also use for travel.”122 However, Rotberg also observes 
that emerging state regimes have sought funding from international monetary funds and 
direct investment from world trade organization members, which require a significant 
amount of oversight, cost and economic concessions that meet foreign national interest. 
As previously mentioned, China has opened zero interest and low interest loans for the 
cost of resource exclusivity and tracts of unexplored land stymieing any real prospect of 
future political reform.123 Brautigam also counters new colonialism criticism stating that 
with increased foreign aid, will come the addition of “experts” to maintain the 
infrastructure programs. Furthermore, Chinese research supports the idea of “being 
responsible to the end” ensuring that foreign aid meets the national objective of the host 
country while deterring corruption.124 
D. CONCLUSION 
Economic and political objectives are China’s greatest interests in Africa, with 
economics dominating China’s foreign policy over the recent decades. China’s approach 
may be focused on the common struggle connecting China and Africa, development, and 
win-win, however corporations acting increasingly in their own self-interest threaten to 
widen the gap and increase the differences between China and African nations. China’s 
essential goals of achieving a more prosperous Chinese society and seeing the great 
renewal of the Chinese nation may very well be at the expense of other nations, however 
unintentional. FOCAC will remain an important platform for the Chinese, and Africa will 
grow in its importance for China. While the “going out” policy was a revolutionary 
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change which presented China with an opportunity for growth, the tangled lines of 
authority and layers of bureaucracy present challenges in transparency, conflicts, and 
contradictions in the bureaucracy that is supposed to oversee and manage Chinese 
commerce and foreign policy. 
 31 
III. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA 
A. FOREIGN POLICY 
In the past 65 years, the U.S. has provided foreign assistance for national security 
interests such as anti-communism, democracy, and in the global war on terrorism, 
commercial interests, and humanitarian concerns.125 U.S. foreign policy towards sub-
Saharan African (SSA) is comprised of “four pillars” that aim to “strengthen democratic 
institutions”; “spur economic growth, trade, and investment”; “advance peace and 
security”; and “promote opportunity and development.”126 A major distinction between 
Chinese foreign policy and that of the United States is the concept of non-interference. 
While both China and the U.S. claim improving economic conditions and development as 
objectives of their foreign policy, in contrast to the Chinese policy, the United States 
seeks to promote democracy and the rule of law. President Obama, in his U.S. Strategy 
Toward sub-Saharan Africa, stated that “the United States will not stand idly by when 
actors threaten legitimately elected governments or manipulate the fairness and integrity 
of democratic processes,” and will support “those who are committed to the principles of 
equality, justice, and the rule of law.”127 The U.S. and other Western institutions attempt 
to hold African governments accountable for corruption, human rights, and the rule of 
law. Often, the difference between Chinese and American directions in their foreign 
policies mean that they adopt different, almost opposite stances within the same 
countries. For example, while the U.S. and the UN have imposed sanctions on Sudan and 
Zimbabwe, China has propped up the regimes of these countries.128 In 2005 when the 
U.S. and the IMF pressured Angola to have greater transparency and reform its oil sector, 
China offered Angola $2 billion.129 
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B. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
The United States has pursued policies that have enabled African nations to 
expand their markets and increase their exports, while tying incentives to democratic 
reform. Notably, U.S. foreign assistance has focused on “growth in development and 
humanitarian aid, particularly global health programs, and…increased security assistance 
directed toward U.S. allies in the anti-terrorism effort.”130 In 2000, the U.S. passed the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), under which sub-Saharan African 
countries that are qualified may export items to the U.S. duty free.131 There are currently 
39 sub-Saharan African countries that qualify for trade privileges under AGOA.132 In 
2004, the United States established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an 
independent aid agency, to provide assistance to developing countries.133 The MCC 
reports to a board of directors chaired by the U.S. Secretary of State.134 The MCC is 
guided by World Bank regulations, and often awards contracts to firms from developed 
nations other than the United States, causing some controversy.135 This serves to 
illustrate the marked difference between U.S. and Chinese foreign aid to Africa. 
Furthermore, both AGOA and the MCC use conditions of good governance as qualifying 
criteria, distinguishing them from Chinese programs.136 The MCC specifically considers 
“control of corruption,” “civil liberties,” and “political rights” indicators when choosing 
countries eligible to receive or to continue receiving aid.137 In 2004, the U.S. established 
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), providing over $18 billion 
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over a five-year period, and another $48 billion for an additional four years.138 Together, 
the MCC and PEPFAR were integral in the U.S. doubling aid to Africa by 2010.139 The 
same year, Africa became the “top recipient region of U.S. aid, at 29%.”140 USAID also 
supports democratization programs in many countries in Africa.141 The Director of 
Foreign Assistance, under the U.S. State Department, guides U.S. foreign aid managed by 
the State Department and USAID, and identifies five strategic objectives of aid: “Peace 
and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; Economic 
Growth; and Humanitarian Assistance.”142 Recent U.S. aid to Africa has largely been for 
emergency situations, with long-term investments in growth nearly flat.143 Nonetheless, 
U.S. foreign policy and its engagement strategy is significantly different from China is in 
its emphasis on democratic reform, free market trade, and security assistance programs, a 
more open and competitive process in distributing aid projects, and does not use its 
foreign policy to leverage its businesses to the extent China does. 
1. Criticism 
Whereas China receives criticism for not getting involved enough, the U.S. 
receives criticism for getting too involved. While the United States has good intentions 
with its foreign policy, in practice the realization of these goals is something still to be 
seen. Jessica Piombo notes that while the U.S. sets high goals of promoting democracy 
and human rights, it has a “consistent record of backing governments that support U.S. 
strategic, economic, or military interests, regardless of the governments’ domestic or 
regional behavior.”144 More often, U.S. actions are driven by emergent situations, 
responding to humanitarian or environmental emergencies, rather than following long-
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term consistent policies.145 U.S. policies have varied from pressuring the government to 
respect human rights, to rewarding governments that opposed communism, regardless of 
their respect for human rights, to supporting governments engaged in the fight against 
terrorism.146 More generally the United States supports and provides aid to governments 
that seek to strengthen democratic processes, and dedicates its efforts and resources to 
securing regional stability to support U.S. national interests. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Humanitarian efforts and democracy are at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy 
toward Africa, while securing and preserving stability and serving U.S. strategic interests 
remain critical. Contradictions in U.S. policy appear when U.S. tenets seem to be 
reprioritized depending on circumstances. Continuing a trend of a policy driven by 
emergent circumstances will leave the U.S. without a true strategic focus and vulnerable 
to misperceptions. The lack of a long-term strategic plan marginalizes U.S. influence vis-
à-vis expanding Chinese influence in Africa. China’s non-interference policy provides a 
lucrative option for African nations, isolating the United States. 
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So far, this study has suggested a fundamental Chinese worldview that permits 
SOEs to guide foreign policy in politically sensitive environments. Supporting these 
findings are statistical models that unify financial, governmental, and security indicators 
to describe Chinese influence on stability in Africa. This study focuses on sub-Saharan 
Africa, which provides important analysis regarding our priority partners on the 
continent, and most closely matches Chinese foreign policy for the region as a whole. 
This analysis relied on open-source information, which highlights an important tool for 
military analysts. Moreover, this methodology illustrates little need for technology to fill 
information gaps for security planners, and policy makers in Africa. Increasingly 
scrutinized for projecting military power in sovereign nations, the United States could 
lower its profile. Platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles and signals intercept 
equipment have unnecessarily exacerbated our partnerships with transitional 
governments. This analysis has also highlighted significant information gaps in Africa 
that have not traditionally received attention. Geospatially referenced survey data could 
inform transitional governments for milestone development, as well as Special 
Operations Command-Africa (SOCAF) of sociopolitical developments that could affect 
regional stability. 
One expectation and complication for this study is the significant amount of 
foreign aid programs enacted by the PRC. These are deeply shrouded in secrecy by the 
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and present an untraceable variable for data collection. 
As Austin Strange (et al.) publication “Trading Under-reported financial flows (TUFF)” 
points out, though China’s direct investment has not reached the level of the United 
States, by 2010 the amount of vague-OOF flows had surpassed the official development 
assistance of the United States.147 OOF represents representational grants that are not 
necessarily focused on developmental aid, but rather enabling foreign business ventures 
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and balancing risk on lines of credit. This suggests that China is not entirely focused on 
revenue, but is increasingly focusing on its longevity and embeddedness in host nation 
economies. In extreme circumstances, political stability will trump all other governmental 
considerations. As Strange, co-founder of the AidData program, points out “Recipient 
regimes can leverage more fungible aid inflows by allocating them to ‘tenure extension 
activities’ that promote leader survival.”148 
Data on Chinese investment is scarce, primarily because China does not submit to 
the OECD oversight for outward direct investment tracking. Recently, the AidData 
program has made substantial contributions to uncovering data on Chinese investments. 
Using “TUFF” methodology, an automated process was created for identifying open 
source data collection of Chines official funding, classifying them as “ODA-like, which 
are similar to U.S. aid programs, and “OOF-like” which represent larger national 
commercial goals.”149 However, significant amounts of data remain classified as “vague” 
and are typically understood to be diplomatic or “representational” extensions such as 
debt forgiveness and non-concessional loans. This study has limited this dataset to the 
years 2006 to 2015, as other studies in the field have replicated these data successfully 
suggesting a higher expectation for statistical accuracy. Numerous fields in the SCAD 
and AidData sets have been aggregated to consider a more generalized perspective of 
Chinese investment in the region. For instance, the original coding in the field of 
“Spontaneous Protest” and “Organized Protest” have been grouped in order to simplify 
the impact on the dependent variable to become “Protest.” Likewise, aid programs have 
been grouped into larger bins, such as “Education” and “Civil Governance” in order to 
tally observations of Chinese support across all African countries.  
Considered globally, the gross domestic product (GDP) serves as a significant 
indicator for conflict onset within the borders of individual sovereign nations, especially 
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in low per capita income nations.150 Generally, GDP has the effect of lowering potential 
for civil unrest as pointed out in Fearon’s study. Africa is unique, in that the majority of 
its regional economies are supported by low GDP nations. For this reason, it is paramount 
to consider GDP in all regression models to ensure the robustness of other independent 
variable that are considered for this study. Despite GDP’s negative correlation with the 
onset of civil unrest, our findings suggest that Chinese FDI acceleration, corruption, and 
political stability also share strong correlations with Chinese aid endowment and civil 
unrest. Limited data points amplify the difficulty of statistical regression for much of this 
regional study. This study’s dataset includes four separate data sources, outlined as 
follows. 
First, the AidData sets represents the breadth of Chinese unreported flows to 
numerous countries, to include the continent of Africa, for a total observation count of 
538 over 54 variables. Of special interest this study were the African countries receiving 
flows, the count of programs by sector, and the aggregate amount of these flows since the 
year 2006. In order to disaggregate a number of the AidData set, R code was used create 
counts tallies for individual aid intents and types which include “Health Count,” 
“Education Count,” “Civil Governance Count,” and “Unspecified.” This was also done 
for the AidData sets aid “intent” column, for statistical robustness. The investigating team 
felt that Austin Strange et al.’s AidData set provides a particular granularity that most 
watchdog committee studies have not considered, and thus the inclusion in this study. 
Second, the World Developmental Indicators database provided data that could 
describe economic decisiveness and competition on the African continent. The research 
team logically organized this dataset “WDI,” by country name and the year of 
observation. Variables included GDP makeup by market sector, exports and import data 
as well as private and public sector influence. This data set describes the market 
environment of host nations as one consideration for Chinese investment attraction. 
Third, data from the World Governance Indicators database created the “WGI” 
dataset. This was again organized by country and year observed, and reflected variables 
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such as host nation corruption, polity, ease of business, and efficient government. This 
dataset describes the health of host nation governments and their ability to maintain their 
borders, providing another potential attractor of Chinese investment. This also provides a 
glimpse into host nation foreign and domestic policy. 
Finally, the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) provided observations of 
the onset of unrest. This database is unique in that it captures low intensity conflict onset 
such as riots, strikes and governmental repression, a generalized but accurate depiction of 
the current security operating environment challenging AFRICOM. For this study, 
conflict lasting for extremely long periods, such as the civil war in Sudan, were thrown 
out, as they stood to overshadow the soft power investigation of the research. Next, new 
columns were created similar in fashion to the rows created in the AidData set, to include 
variations on the “etype” column disaggregated into “Strike count,” “Riot Count,” 
“Government Violence,” and “Insurgent Activity.” This dataset describes the potential 
addition of social conflict as yet another security challenge for AFRICOM to address. 
This analysis is broken down into three sections as each of our hypotheses are 
investigated. First, the connection between Chinese aid, FDI flows and market disruption 
are explored. Next, host governmental attraction to Chinese investment as highlighted 
and some potential pitfalls regarding African domestic policies are described. Finally, the 
potential for the onset of civil unrest is investigated, relying on statistical evidence found 
in the preceding paragraphs. Both quantitative and qualitative references are used to 
illustrate local phenomenon exacerbated by the Chinese emergence model. 
B. EXPANDING CHINESE MARKETS 
Chinese corporations, largely backed by the central government, have been 
increasing their holds in market sectors throughout Africa. For instance, Ghana’s trade 
deficit has grown from $70 million in 2000, to $474 million in 2006, to $4 billion in 
2012.151 In Kenya, China’s exports to Kenya were at $139 million in 2001, and $2.4 
billion in 2011, while imports from Kenya were at $6 million and $60 million, 
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respectively, indicating a trade deficit that has grown from just over $130 million to 
nearly $2.4 billion in 10 years.152 
This study tested Chinese terms of trade in the African region in order to more 
fully illustrate how operating in a trade deficit in China can lead to larger issues. This 
hypothesis assumes that China seeks resources as well as markets for finished goods, and 
may show preference to host nations that accommodate their economic goals. In order to 
test this, the AidData China dataset provided the dependent variable of total Chinese aid 
projects. Observations of projects were counted and grouped by host country and year. 
Next, an indicator for internal capability was created by using the World Developmental 
Indicators dataset. Internal capability was calculated by adding together GDP indicators 
by country and year that represented natural resource and services capitalization for the 
respective host nation. Finally, our hypothesis was tested by adding an independent 
variable of market competition. This was calculated by subtracting host-nation goods and 
services percentage of GDP from the same nations merchandise percentage of GDP, and 
then dividing this by the sum of the two indicators. Market competition therefore 
illustrates a spectrum index, where larger numbers represent economies heavily invested 
in resource extraction and export, while smaller numbers represent more industrialized 
economies. 
China not only targets countries that are resource-laden with timber, ore and oil, 
but that also do not possess the technology to turn these into sources of revenue. 
Evidence further implies that countries that do not pose a threat to other Chinese resource 
investment markets, receive higher amounts of aid. This suggests that China is not 
necessarily worried about the “global-ness” of any one country’s export market, but 
rather, its potential strength in within a region in Africa. This regression shows that there 
is a breaking point for Chinese investment attraction, as GDP and market competition 
have an interrelated effect on Chinese OF. This model is expanded upon in Table 4, 
illustrating that economies that operate under regional merchandise import deficits as 
well as goods and service export deficits appear to receive higher amount of Chinese aid. 
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This suggests that China takes advantage of intra-regional terms of trade to lower their 
operating price margin and maintain market exclusivity. This is important as security 
planners consider the stability of the region as a whole. If, as suggested, China invests 
only in what is convenient, while altering the terms of trade between numerous nations, 
then long term engagement plans will be challenged to succeed. Austin Strange similarly 
considers the impact of Chinese aid shock, the sudden removal of aid from a host 
nation.153 China will leave behind nations as it converges with U.S. interest in numerous 
of African countries. Perhaps the U.S. government will find opportunity in this 
reshuffling of strategic partners in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
 
Lower scores of “Market Competition” describe heavily industrialized nations while 
higher scores represent commodity-based economies. China favors industrialization, 
particularly those with untapped, unrefined resources that offer a domestic market for 
finished goods. 
Figure 4.  Chinese Aid versus African Nation Market Competition154 
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A study conducted by Weinji Chen, David Dollar and Heiwai Tang, suggested 
that Chinese investment “is concentrated in the more capital-intensive sectors in countries 
that are both politically unstable and scarce in capital.”155 Moreover, this study 
highlighted that Chinese firms are motivated to invest in a country’s “comparative 
advantage,” offering existing hydroelectric and transportation projects in East Africa as 
attractive examples.156 To add perspective, this study sheds light on the interaction of 
host nation market advantages and existing Chinese aid programs. In Figure 4 above, the 
x-axis represents market competition, where the right side of the scale describes 
economies that are heavily weighted toward regional natural resource exports and related 
services. The left side of the x-axis represents economies that are more industrialized and 
rely on the export of finished products, to include manufactured goods, clothing items, 
and produce. The moving up the y-axis illustrates an increase in the expected number of 
Chinese aid programs endowed in the same economy. Three colored lines delineate three 
levels of internal capability of the same target economy. Internal capability describes the 
extent that GDP depends on internal resources to produce capital for the economy. As 
this figure illustrates, Chinese aid is more likely to be attracted to economies with little 
natural resources, or perhaps extraction technology, but are more heavily dependent on 
the production of finished goods. The coefficients for both variables, Internal Capability 
and Market Competition, are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level, as shown by 
Model 1 in Table 3. This coefficient become more intense when the total aid type is 
disaggregated, the greatest statistical significance attributed to “mixed intent” as shown in 
Table 3. The AidData coding scheme defines mixed intent as aid that “cannot be 
categorized… because (a) the project has both commercial and development intent, or (b) 
the project has both representational and developmental intent.”157 This is important 
because these types of aid go unnoticed by the OECD and substantially increase the 
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amount of foreign inflows when compared to standard reporting by the IMF and World 
Bank. 
This study dissects the market sector competition generated by China’s 
investment strategy in Africa and its potential to influence local environmental 
conditions. So far, the study has suggested that Chinese aid endowment is highly 
dependent on the domestic economic potential of a target country. Furthermore, this 
study has suggested that Chinese SOEs, and private corporations invest aggressively in 
target countries that have received Chinese aid endowments, typically those that seek 
infrastructure improvement. This study has illuminated a calculated Chinese approach, 
where aid paves the way for manufacturing and service sector growth, but which seems 
to generate unintended increases in social unrest as well. 
In his book China’s Second Continent, Howard French suggests that sector 
strength relies on local markets and that new sectors will be created when there is new 
demand.158 For the Chinese, decades old infrastructure projects have created this 
demand, spanning from simple road and bridge improvement initiatives to the extensive 
development of the Tanzania-Zambia (TANZAM) railway. For instance, the road 
builders of Mozambique produced considerable competition for governments contracts, 
which of course where funded by Chinese and other nation’s developmental aid. Chinese 
migrant workers were able to keep their costs low enough to corner markets on similar 
sector markets because of cooperative effort to dominate the other portions of that sector. 
To lower costs, Chinese road companies diversified holdings to own hotel properties, 
transportation, and used truck and equipment rentals. On the social level, this also 
became the preferred method for entrepreneurs to get their start in Africa. French 
captures the case of Hao in Mozambique, a Chinese migrant that found the road service 
sector could help him secure the trust of local governance. This relationship later awarded 
him 50,000 acres of agricultural property when the local government decided to invest.159 
At the time of Howard French’s publication, China increased its aid count from $120 
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million in 2006 to $2 billion in 2012. During the same period civil unrest counts jumped 
from just four to 23, with 50% of these incidents accounting for government violence 
aimed toward its citizens. Subsequently, the country’s market mixture slid toward a 
market competition index that represented an acceleration in the manufacturing sector. 
Ana Alves describes an even stronger argument for Mozambique’s having 
attracted Chinese interest. As she mentions, “of the 8 Portuguese speaking countries in 
the world, 5 reside in Africa,” with Mozambique included in that list.160 The Portuguese 
shared a common colonial interest with the Chinese in Macau Province until 1999, two 
years after the British relinquished Hong Kong. The Chinese government, only one year 
away from establishing the FOCAC, understood that this commonality through language 
and economic interests was an important advantage worth nurturing. It is no coincidence 
that the center for Chinese coordination with Portuguese speaking countries is now 
established in Macau. More recently this closeness has disparaged local innovation and 
has largely depreciated the value of the local service sectors. In addition, Chinese 
developmental endowments can include raw materials such as steel, allowing Chinese 
industry to further capitalize on the new market growth, ironically by their own migrant 
service sector.161 
This suggests that China is less than systematic about its approach to foreign 
policy, and prefers to take a pragmatic view of economic expansion. This study of 
Mozambique’s industrialization provides a possible prediction of similar stability 
outcomes in Kenya. This study’s statistical analysis infers that in African nations where 
both high amounts of individual autonomy and political instability exist, there is an 
exponential increase in civil unrest (see Table 2). This is not surprising given 
authoritarian regimes are much more politically capable, and willing, to mitigate their 
weaknesses through civil repression. However, it is no coincidence that Chinese FDI has 
matched Chinese aid endowment since 2006, throughout Kenya’s well documented 
political turbulence. This is also the case in Niger, Sudan and Cameroon though at lower 
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orders of magnitude. As Villoria has illustrated in detail, the Chinese deflation of export 
markets in Kenya are substantial. In fact, in the sectors of apparel, basic metals, leather 
goods and machinery Chinese supply capacity had lowered the value of exports by as 
much as 58% in 2006.162 
C. UNGOVERNED SPACES 
A key tenet to U.S. foreign policy in Africa, and an issue that has plagued many 
African nations, is good governance. The United States seeks to promote democracy and 
stability through its economic and political policies, and military engagements in Africa. 
Corrupt regimes, undemocratic practices, and poor governance generally can lead to 
instability, fragile states, and enclaves that can harbor threats to local, regional, and 
global security. While internal factors do drive poor governance and instability, this 
section will consider external factors that can influence enclaves known as ungoverned 
spaces. Of significance, Chinese actions, specifically the disbursement of aid without 
conditions and China’s non-interference policy can increase the division between a 
nation’s central government-controlled regions and its ungoverned regions, leading to 
instability and undermining the international communities’ efforts to promote good 
governance. 
The concept of ungoverned spaces and weak and fragile states in Africa and their 
potential threat to global security is a growing topic of concern for the United States and 
larger international community. Michael Leiter, former director of the National Counter 
Terrorism Center observed that ungoverned spaces are “certainly a problem and an area 
that the U.S. government is particularly challenged in addressing.”163 Jessica Piombo 
identifies the “ungoverned nature of Africa” as “large swathes of the continent and its 
people lay outside of the control of formal state agencies; borders are largely unpatrolled 
and unenforceable; and the governments that do exist are often run by individuals who 
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regard public office as an economic commodity rather than a public duty.”164 These 
spaces have the potential to harbor illicit activity, violent non-state actors (VNSAs) drug 
traffickers, and terrorist organizations. Mark Duffield makes the connection “that because 
of ungoverned space, fragile states are vulnerable to colonization by agents of insecurity, 
specifically terrorists and drug traffickers.”165 His idea of “contingent sovereignty” 
underscores that these states can threaten security.166 A more pointed concern is what 
does China’s activities in Africa mean for ungoverned spaces? 
The definition of ungoverned space varies, but most recognize that there is a 
spectrum of control and threats that can challenge state authority, and that these areas are 
more or less isolated from state governance and economic structures. The United States 
Department of Defense defines ungoverned spaces as: 
places where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to 
extend control, influence the local population, or otherwise effectively 
govern, and where a provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government 
does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance 
capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of 
conflict, or restrictive norms.167 
The DOD states that ungoverned spaces are potential safe havens. The 
Department of State defines safe havens as “physical areas where terrorists are able to 
organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative 
security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.”168 Piombo 
recognizes the presence of alternate forms of authority, stating that “often there is order 
within apparent chaos, but it is an order that escapes the notice of the Western observer, 
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because it may rely on localized, traditional or non-formal systems of governance.”169 
She also observes that states may deliberately exclude territory in the periphery, choosing 
instead to maintain effective sovereignty over “specific geographical locations that are 
economically productive.”170 Chloe Diggins states that ungoverned spaces are “complex 
social spaces that are shaped by internal relations between populations, alternative 
authority structures and informal economies, as well as external influences that contribute 
to how these spaces are both constructed and perceived by the outside world.”171 Monika 
François and Inder Sud state that “fragile states can be considered as precursors to 
eventual failure,” which can lead to greater challenges for the region and international 
community.172 
In Africa, ungoverned spaces are generally associated with areas in the Sahel 
region, Niger delta, Gulf of Guinea, and Swahili Coast.173 Countries in these regions are 
not “abandoned” by international investors, but, as James Ferguson notes, are sought 
after and have proved to be “strong performers” in “economic growth.”174 Ferguson 
observes the connection between capitalism and “mineral-rich enclaves,” and points out 
that foreign investment focuses on resource-rich areas, disregarding other regions that do 
not have similar resources, which can effectively become “off the grid.”175 While 
Ferguson revealed a tie between mineral wealth political complexity, Piombo’s 
recognition of areas that are economically productive is more relevant in Africa today as 
economic activity has grown to include not just a focus on natural resources, but market 
sectors such as manufacturing, technology, transportation, and agriculture. 
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This study considered to what degree the socio-political environment may be 
affected by Chinese aid and investment. In order to this, model 2 was created, were 
unemployment data from the WGI dataset provided the dependent variable. governmental 
indicators from the World Governance Indicators dataset also provided the independent 
variables of perception of corruption and government effectiveness. The polity dataset 
also provided a measurement of a host nation regime’s liberal values, which is later 
described in more detail. Lastly, the USAID and AidData set considered the addition of 
Aid to affect the onset of civil unrest. Early graphical representations qualitatively 
illustrated a time lag between aid endowment, FDI and changes in the local environment, 
as should be expected. To account for this time lag, the independent variables of Chinese 
FDI and the dependent variable of unrest were broken down to include effects during 
time lag year +1 through year +4. For model 2, the expectation is that Chinese aid may 
represent a stronger correlation with unemployment in years subsequent to aid 
endowment. Table 1 illustrates a few obvious correlations, such as total unrest potentially 
increasing the amount of unemployment. However, this table also illustrates an 
interesting correlation involving USAID and government effectiveness. Therefore, the 
connection between governmental effectiveness and economic viability in developing 
nations is not the same as in other places of the world. Table 1 uses unemployment as a 
way to demonstrate the impact of aid programs in the region. Here, USAID does in fact, 
impact unemployment, ostensibly by improving government outreach and job 
availability. However, this also shows that government effectiveness in Africa tends to 
increase unemployment. Qualitatively, this makes sense in areas such as Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, and Nairobi that have experienced rapid urbanization. Coincidentally, China 
has seized these opportunities to invest heavily in the public housing sector, most notably 
in the quarrying and production of concrete, through the joint venture of Kenya’s Athi 
River Mining Limited (ARM) and the China Road and Bridge Company.176 This 
investment of government will only serve urbanites, and will not create additional jobs 
when the construction, and materials, are being outsourced. 
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Figure 5.  Social Unrest versus Corruption Perception177 
Having now considering the importance of unrest effecting unemployment, and 
the possibility that governmental efficiency may impact this interaction, this study further 
investigated which variables most effect civil unrest directly. Regression model 3 was 
created by establishing the dependent variable of civil unrest by using the SCAD data 
base. As mentioned before, this database is unique in that it considered social conflicts 
that are below the threshold of the more often used ACLED and GED databases. Events 
in this database include clashes between government and insurgent formations, riots and 
even labor strikes. As mentioned before, these data points were time lagged in order to 
represent the effect of independent variable at year +1 through year +4. Model 3 is 
represented in Table 2, where the independent variables again included polity (regime 
type), unemployment, USAID, Chinese aid, and the perception of governmental 
corruption in the host nation. Model 3 illustrates a statistically significant correlation 
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between anti-corruption and civil unrest, which grows stronger when the host nation 
regime becomes more democratic. 
Figure 5 describes the interaction between governmental credibility, human rights 
in a citizenry, and the amount of social unrest in an African nation. Moving right along 
the x-axis represents an increase in the public perception that the host government is not 
corrupt. Moving up along the y-axis will represent an increase in the expected number of 
social unrest events in the host nation in a given year. The colored lines represent 
differing levels of representative governments, where a score of -10 represents totalitarian 
rule and +10 represents a fully elected democratic regime. Table 2 represents the control 
variables considered to explore this relationship, with “polity” and “Anti-corrupt” 
proving statistically significant (p<0.01) across all lag years. The chart highlights that, 
generally, unrest in Africa is highly impacted by the amount of control a government 
exerts over the population, and is amplified by the perception of the government’s 
legitimacy. In Figure 5 above, transitioning governments find themselves in a difficult 
position. While attempting to become more democratic, countries with less than a 50% 
corruption rating, will experience an increase in social unrest. In the remarkably low 
corruption scores, transitioning governments are likely to experience a threefold increase 
in social unrest. With these barriers, it is even more important for the United States to 
tread lightly with political reformation policies that Chinese aid programs are smart to 
omit. On the other hand, programs that increase the legitimacy of our partner nations 
could provide an alternative. It is also noteworthy, that USAID appears to have the first 
year impact of increasing social unrest, though a weak positive correlation it is still 
statistically significant (p<0.01). 
Table 1 evaluates the impact of numerous control variables on unemployment in 
Africa. Notably, the correlation between unemployment and total-unrest is statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the WGI indicator for government effectiveness, appears to 
have a positive relationship with unemployment in Africa, the impact only amplified by 
USAID dollars. Initially, this may seem counterintuitive, but USAID typically targets 
countries that are experiencing these types of difficulties, resulting in the correlation. 
Moreover, Chinese aid does not share a significant relationship with unemployment in a 
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host country. This is also counter to the Chinese narrative that project enhance skilled 
sectors and increase job opportunities. This evaluation was expanded to include three 
years of lag time to ensure an appropriate amount of market reaction time to economic 
and governmental stimulus. 
Certainly China is not the only external actor that can influence stability in Africa, 
specifically the interaction between a state government and ungoverned spaces. Many 
Western practices are also heavily criticized. François and Sud point out that reform and 
democratization practices pursued by Western nations can be beyond the state’s capacity 
to implement and even lead to exacerbating internal conflicts.178 Duffield claims that 
Non-Government Organizations can actually destabilize internal systems unique to a state 
by providing assistance outside of the state, and that these alternatives to state functions 
can create what he calls zones of “contingent sovereignty.”179 With China’s growing 
investment in Africa, China’s influence and the effects of its foreign policy demand the 
consideration of China’s relevance to stability and ungoverned spaces in Africa. 
To the extent that external actors influence and affect a state’s internal dynamics 
with regards to governance, security and development, Chinese aid and investment will 
directly or indirectly affect the nature of ungoverned spaces in Africa. As stated above, 
China’s model for development in Africa follows its own experiences, and maintains a 
policy of non-interference in a state’s affairs. But China cannot simply just look the other 
way. Piombo noted that “the feedback loop between governance, security, and 
development defies simple causality, and means that efforts to address any single side of 
the triangle must take into account the other two.”180 This demands further consideration 
by all international actors, whether following a Western model or a Chinese one. 
A 2015 study conducted by Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Roland Hodler, Bradley 
C. Parks, Paul A. Raschky, and Michael J. Tierney highlighted that African leaders are 
able to more easily manipulate funding from China to suit their domestic political 
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purposes. Furthermore, the birthplace of an African leader receives nearly four times 
more financial support from China while that leader is in power.181 Similar to the 
government’s preference for regions of economic productivity, the result of this practice 
is much to the detriment of the remaining population. Sarah Raine suggests that “As 
African elites seek to capitalize on foreign interest…these elites should improve financial 
reserves and political capacity. The international community may yet be faced 
with…wayward leaders akin to Sudan’s al Bashir.”182 Ungoverned enclaves consistently 
present issues that developing nations are unable to handle. Furthermore, successful 
collective action strongly favors enclaves, those groups that never fully embed within a 
nation, yet take part in a transnational base of support. 
There are positive aspects of China’s actions in African nations. Richard Schiere 
notes that in many sub-Saharan fragile states, China and other donors are active in 
building “infrastructure, social services, stable public finances, sufficient economic 
growth and employment creation.”183 
This development however, is only one part of the triangle. Sarah Raine states 
that compared to China, the United States is more concerned with ungoverned spaces, 
democracy and good governance, development and disease.184 While China does follow 
a non-interference policy, it has, to some extent, involved itself in interstate or intrastate 
affairs, either directly or indirectly. When there is a clear African mandate China has 
participated in UN peacekeeping operations, such as Mali in 2013, where it committee 
combat troops for the first time, and South Sudan, where in 2015 China sent the first ever 
Chinese Infantry Battalion.185 This has also been the case in Sudan. In 2013, Western 
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donors withdrew their support from Rwanda when the government was accused of 
supporting a rebel group in the Democratic Republic of Congo.186 China provided $35 
million in interest-free loans and grants to Rwanda, even as China provided support to the 
DRC.187 While China claims to have a non-interference policy, even if unintentionally it 
can have a negative impact on regional stability and create contradictions in its own 
policy. 
As China’s influence in Africa increases with its aid, investments, and physical 
presence, it will have to be cognizant of the unintended effects its policies have on 
dynamics within, across, and between states. China seeks to gain an economic advantage 
out of its relationship with African nations, and to the degree that it is altruistically 
concerned with developing African nations and fostering stability, China must recognize 
the second and third order effects of its policies. Economic policies that marginalize 
geographic and demographic areas of a state will further isolate portions of the 
population, widen the gap between ungoverned or alternate authority structures and the 
state government, and enable illicit, violent, or terrorist activity. 
D. INSTABILITY 
Social unrest in Africa is pervasive and historically entrenched. A stated early in 
this study, stability implies that a host nation government has met the challenges of 
current problems and events through extensions of its power to maintain control. This 
study has alluded that perceived economic improvement does not necessarily equate 
improved stability. Likewise, U.S. defense planners should consider that the U.S. 
government’s objective of stability might be misunderstood. The table below shows that 
there is no initial statistical evidence that the introduction of Chinese official funding 
results in a change in civil unrest onset, with one exception: riots appear to happen less 
when Chinese “vague flows” increases in a country. Strange’s study highlights the 
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question: is there a possibility that China chooses countries that have agency within their 
government to redirect “vague aid” to solve domestic instability? Could this repress local 
security problems until they become a regional issue? 
As the model has demonstrated, China prefers developing economies that have 
not found their legs in the regional export market. When the year over year 
competitiveness index is considered by sector, countries that were shown to exhibit 
attractiveness to Chinese OF are concentrated in Basic Manufactures and Fresh Food 
production. After paring down potential countries that exhibit the market condition 
described, it is interesting that though other countries have more successful markets, 
China has focused effort in Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. 
To consider the effect of FDI on unrest as they corresponded to other national 
indicators (Table 5), the modeling equation was used to determine the expected amount 
of FDI that China would theoretically invest in each host nation. Comparing the 
differences between the actual and theoretical amount, it is clear which nations were 
regarded as true priorities versus opportunistic business ventures. Among the top rated 
were Algeria, Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya. Also considering Sudan, these countries 
have posed an incredible amount of political risk to China throughout long periods of 
civil unrest and regime instability. 
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Figure 6.  Chinese FDI Residual Analysis Since 2006188 
As illustrated in this discussion, Chinese FDI shares a strong correlation with both 
Chinese Aid and social unrest in Africa. Though these relationships do not provide 
insight, to what extent China’s economic presence is exacerbating existing conditions, the 
information can provide perspective on Chinese priorities on the continent. The above 
diagram represents the intensity of residual calculations of Chinese FDI given control 
variables listed in Table 5. This calculation was completed by using an interpolative tool 
to predict the expected amount of FDI by country since 2005, based on this study’s 
model. These numbers were then subtracted from the actual amount of reported FDI 
found in this study’s dataset. The difference was then plotted by color intensity by each 
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country respectively. The red dots illustrate social conflict events reported in the SCAD 
database. This diagram provides powerful evidence that Chinese investment pursues 
regional volatility in order to capitalize on market conditions. This map shows that 
Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, and Sudan have received much higher Chinese investment 
than what should be expected from countries with similar stability and market indicators. 
This data further suggests that weakening regimes may provide increased SOE 
and private business opportunities, especially where aid initiatives already exist. 
Coincidentally, the U.S. heavily focuses on advising host-nation governments to observe 
human rights, democratic processes, and representative local governance. Though these 
things are important, for transitional governments, there are serious political stability and 
legitimacy challenges that may be more important. This study’s findings support Ali 
Zafar’s observation that Chinese SOEs typically operate in “enclave and extractive 
industries...and tend not to have many linkages with local firms, especially in global 
production chains.”189 Zafar goes on to highlight that specifically within manufacturing 
economies, China markets finished materials to importing economies that do not benefit 
form AGOA, which has the added effect of depreciating AGOA material export 
values.190 Likewise, foreign government, such as China will most likely prey on the 







                                                 
189 Ali Zafar, “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, 
Trade, Investment, and Aid Links,” The World Bank Research Observer 22, no. 1 (2007): 124. 
190 Zafar, “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa,” 124. 
 56 




In 2014 oil price fluctuated, and damaged the Russian economy and challenged 
our eastern European allies’ regional economic balance. Could the same result befall an 
economy built on steel, diamonds, and copper? Alternatively, could agricultural products 
become the key to freeing a Chinese military budget expansion? At the very least, 
understanding the African conflict nexus is paramount to U.S. defense planning on the 
continent. It is clear that that China’s approach to capitalism in Africa does not consider 
the stability issues created by aggressive SOEs for weak regimes. In addition, Chinese 
foreign policy is reflected heavily in aid endowment programs, but are very closely tied 
to commercial investments. Therefore, China’s non-interference policy ultimately serves 
to misinform U.S. international trade partners as much as it attracts transitioning regimes. 
This study suggests that China’s model can affect U.S. policy in two major ways. 
First, China’s foreign policy is not reflected in the actions of its SOEs and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Furthermore, simple price margin management 
cannot explain the extent that SOEs have accepted risk, and in many cases lost, in Africa. 
Zafar states that Chinese SOEs “acquired minority and majority stakes in foreign 
companies [and] are heavily subsidized, with low capital costs and low profitability 
margins.”191 He illustrates that these deals are primarily for the purpose of establishing 
economic zones, and maintaining access.192 Additional evidence suggested that Chinse 
endowment programs directly link Chinese EXIM bank to host nation banks, raising the 
potential for currency manipulation that favors Chinese exports. At the host-nation level, 
this could increase long-term indebtedness, encourage natural resource bartering and 
promote a cruder economy. As this study has illustrated, asymmetric goods and service 
markets -at best- increase the probability of unemployment as well as social unrest. 
During global economic slowdowns, these characteristics improve the chances that a 
weak regime will provide political accommodation in return for aid. In this way, China 
has significantly weakened trade unions organized by the United States to assist with 
                                                 
191 Zafar, “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa,” 124. 
192 Zafar, “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa,” 124–25. 
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African economic development and diplomatic closeness. Moreover, China uses these 
networks of business to lower its manufacturing costs and monopolize market sectors, 
while moving resources from resource-laden nations to labor-intensive manufacturing 
markets. 
Second, China’s investment approach inherently requires the support of the host 
nation and may affect our African partner’s reliability on U.S. policy objectives. Chinese 
SOEs undermine U.S. governance efforts by creating a false image of host nation 
economic growth. Additionally, this study has highlighted that aid programs do not have 
dollar for dollar impacts. Coincidentally, the host nations where governance indicators 
improved actually experienced an increase in unemployment and civil unrest. Even if the 
effects of urbanization might explain this inverse relationship, good governance programs 
should be evaluated for potential asymmetric returns. This dichotomy suggests that a 
deterioration in local conditions may change the opinion of constituents where some 
individual autonomy exists. Statistical analysis has suggested a strong positive 
relationship between social unrest and Chinese FDI acceleration (see Table 5). This 
correlation further infers that where personal freedom is high, social stability will suffer 
until legitimacy issues are addressed within the host nation government. Currently, 
Chinese SOEs and aid incentive schemes do little to endear African transitional 
governments to their citizens. This is compounded by a perception of corruption, a 
problem with which many of our African partner governments struggle. David Brown 
concludes that while western nations have agreed to the 1990s OECD anti bribery 
conventions, China has not. While its government continues to operate this way at home, 
MOFCOM will continue to take advantage of weaker African governments.193 
This study has highlighted a significant gap in data regarding the state of our 
partners in Africa. The collection of this type of intelligence will require a different 
mindset, and dual-purpose missions. Rooted in over a decade of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) contingency operations, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
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doctrine has focused heavily on “hearts and minds” concepts to target the root causes of 
instability while applying a whole of government approach to the problem set. This is 
operationalized broadly, but for military planners, has focused heavily on Foreign 
Internal Defense programs. As illustrated in this article, the African security problem is 
not so straight forward, involving a diverse cast of domestic, foreign and corporate 
incursions into free market politics. Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAF) 
should seriously consider the collaborative intelligence efforts that will be demanded to 
fully understand our strategic partnering portfolio while striving to enhance State 
department programs that are attempting do the same. 
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APPENDIX A.  ADDITIONAL FIGURES 
 
Figure 7.  Trade Performance Index: Basic Manufacturing 2014194 
 
Figure 8.  Trade Performance Index: Fresh Food 2014195 
                                                 
194 Adapted from “Trade Map,” International Trade Centre, www.intracen.org/marketanalysis. 
195 Adapted from “Trade Map.” 
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APPENDIX B.  TABLES 
Table 1.   African Unemployment Rates196 
 
African nations exhibit higher unemployment rates where government effectiveness is perceived as high. 
Though USAID clearly targets similar traits in host governments, it may not translate into increased 
economic growth or opportunity for citizens.  
                                                 
196Adapted from “AidData.org”; Salehyan et al., “Social Conflict in Africa”; Strange et al., “Tracking 
Underreported Financial Flows China’s Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited”; 
“World Development Indicators, The World Bank”; “World Governance Indicators, The World Bank.” 
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Table 2.   African Civil Unrest Factors, with Year Lag197 
 
Unemployment and counter corruption efforts are among the most significant factors that affect violent 
onset in Africa. Notably, neither the U.S. nor Chinese aid significantly impact the potential for unrest.  
                                                 
197 Adapted from “AidData.org”; Salehyan et al., “Social Conflict in Africa”; Strange et al., “Tracking 
Underreported Financial Flows China’s Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited”; 
“World Governance Indicators, The World Bank”; “World Development Indicators, The World Bank.” 
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Table 3.   Chinese Aid and Market Competition198 
 
                                                 
198 Adapted from Salehyan et al., “Social Conflict in Africa”; Strange et al., “Tracking Underreported 
Financial Flows China’s Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited”; “World 
Development Indicators, The World Bank”; “World Governance Indicators, The World Bank.” 
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Table 4.   Chinese Aid Endowment Criteria199  
 
                                                 
199 Adapted from Strange et al., “Tracking Underreported Financial Flows China’s Development 
Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited”; “Trade Map”; “Market Access Map,” International Trade 
Centre, www.intracen.org/marketanalysis. 
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Table 5.   Chinese FDI Criteria, with Year Lag200 
 
                                                 
200 Adapted from “AidData.org”; Salehyan et al., “Social Conflict in Africa”; Strange et al., “Tracking 
Underreported Financial Flows China’s Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited”; 
“World Development Indicators, The World Bank”; “World Governance Indicators, The World Bank.” 
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